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RUSSIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: A BRIEF HISTORY 
Cindy Skach* 
ABSTRACT 
Why is the word impeachment so terrible? After all, if 
the Congress passed such a motion it would have no 
legal force. A popularly elected president could not be 
removed from power by the Congress, especially this 
Congress, which had long ago lost the people’s trust.1 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
For Americans who just lived through the second impeachment of 
the nation’s 45th president, these words sound strangely familiar. But 
the familiarity is no coincidence. Rather, it is part of the pathology 
induced by the mechanics of the constitution and the office of the 
presidency: its direct election and its fixed terms. In 2017, things had 
become so problematic in Russia that British Prime Minister Theresa 
May claimed Russia was threatening the international order.2 The 
following year, the US Pentagon stated that Russia was more of a 
threat to democracy than terrorism.3 To be sure, the democratic 
opening in post-communist Russia has been an arduous, and by no 
means linear, process. Back in 1994, just after the start of the transition 
to democracy, the first Russian President Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin still 
considered Russia to be “legalized anarchy.”4 In 1998, the international 
human rights organization Freedom House considered Russia to be 
only a “partly free” transitional polity—a “work-in-progress.”5 For 
years, analysts inside and outside Russia have been predicting a grim 
future, sometimes fearing Latin American-style military intervention 
or an extreme nationalist, quasi-fascist outcome.6 
 
2 Theresa May, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Speech at Lord Mayor’s 
Banquet, 14 November 2017. 
3 Adam Taylor, Pentagon says China, Russia are bigger problems for US than 
terrorists. Voters may not agree, WASH. POST, January 20, 2018. 
4 Yeltsin, supra note 1, at 6. 
5 See the article by the President of Freedom House, Adrian Karatnycky, 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE NEW 
INDEPENDENT STATES: A PROGRESS REPORT, NATIONS IN TRANSIT 1997: CIVIL 
SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY AND MARKETS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE 
NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES 3-16 (New Brunswick and London: Transaction 
Publishers, 1997); see also the cautious views of Russian ‘democracy’ expressed 
by leading Russian political analysts in Liliya Shevtsova, ed., Rossiya: desyat’ 
voprosov o samom vazhnom (Moscow: Carnegie Centre, 1997). 
6 Special: Russia’s Crisis, THE ECONOMIST, July 11, 1998, at 19–21. 
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The difficulties Russia faces in its struggle towards democracy 
result, to a great extent, from the multi-dimensional character of its 
transition agenda. Russia has been faced not only with a political 
transition, but with the almost simultaneous tasks of transforming its 
economy, shaping a post-Cold War foreign policy, and resolving its 
national question. Russia, to a much greater extent than many other 
countries, has faced challenges posed by a completely unsettled sense 
of identity and problems of “stateness.”7 As Archie Brown writes, 
“[N]o other country in the world which has embarked on the course of 
transition to democracy has had such a complicated, quadruple task.”8 
So was it overdetermined? No. This article argues that it was not, but 
rather, that Russia’s constitution—the form known as semi-
presidentialism—actually complicated Russia’s transition in the face 
of these huge transition tasks, facilitating the turn to a pattern of 
governance we might call constitutional dictatorship.9 When we 
 
7 See RONALD GRIGOR SUNY, THE REVENGE OF THE PAST: NATIONALISM, 
REVOLUTION, AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION (Stanford University 
Press, 1993); JOHN DUNLOP, RUSSIA: IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY? IN IAN 
BREMMER AND RAY TARAS, EDS. NEW STATES, NEW POLITICS: BUILDING THE 
POST-SOVIET NATIONS 29–95 (Cambridge University Press, 1997); Philip G. 
Roeder, Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization, 43 World Politics 196–232 
(January 1991); Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation, pp. 366–400 (A discussion of the difficulties “stateness” problems 
posed for the democratic transition in Russia); see Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalisms (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1983); and Ernst B. Haas, “What Is Nationalism and Why 
Should We Study It?” International Organization Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer 1986), 
pp. 707–44. (general questions of identity and citizenship) 
8 See JON ELSTER, THE NECESSITY AND IMPOSSIBILITY OF SIMULTANEOUS 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM (1990); DOUGLAS GREENBERG, STANLEY N. 
KATZ, MELANIE BETH OLIVIERO AND STEVEN C. WHEATLEY, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 157 (Oxford University Press, 1993) 
9 See “Izmenenie Konstitutsii?”, Nezavisimaya gazeta, Nov. 6, 1998, pp. 1–3; The 
Russian Crisis: Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning? 15(1) Post-Soviet 
Affairs 55–71, 65–69 (1999) (Explaining that throughout the 1990s, an increasing 
number of articles and documents calling for constitutional reform in Russia, 
spanning across the ideological spectrum). 
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examine Russia’s first decade on three conditions that are necessary 
for the semi-presidential constitution to function well—the degree to 
which its presidents have been genuine members of political parties, 
the majority building capacity of Russia’s electoral system, and the 
structural consolidation of Russia’s party system—Russia has had very 
unfavorable values on each of these conditions. And this, in semi-
presidentialism, can be lethal.10 
I. THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA’S POLITICAL SPECTRUM  
And if we look at the three distinct periods in Yeltsin’s 
administration, for example, from 1991 to 1993, from 1993 to 1995, and 
from 1995 to 1998, we see that President Yeltsin never enjoyed a stable 
single party or even coalitional majority in either the Congress of 
People’s Deputies (from 1991 to 1993), or the State Duma (from 1993 to 
1999). The same is true for the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet from 
1991 to 1993, and for the Russian prime ministers (from 1993 to August 
1998). Between 1991 and 1993, the Congress, which had not been 
elected in multi-party elections, had two main blocs. The first bloc was 
the umbrella organization known as “Democratic Russia” (DR). The 
second bloc was the Communist Party (KPRF). Both were diverse 
groupings plagued by internal cleavages.11 The DR, which supported 
Yeltsin’s election to the post of first Russian President, held about 40% 
of the RSFSR Congress seats.12 It was described as “very amorphous, 
very diffuse and [without] a formal organizational structure.’”13 The 
KPRF, similarly, was beset by internal divisions based on “multiple 
political-ideological tendencies.”14 
 
10 CINDY SKACH, BORROWING CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005). 
11 See ARCHIE BROWN, THE GORBACHEV FACTOR 188–89 (1996). 
12 JERRY F. HOUGH ET AL., THE 1996 RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 32 
(Brookings Institution Press 1996). 
13 STEPHEN WHITE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION: SHAPING A POST-SOVIET 
FUTURE 161 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1993). 
14 Joan Barth Urban & Valerii D. Solovei, Russia’s Communists at the Crossroads 
37 (Westview Press 1997). 
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Even after the first “quasi-multiparty” elections in 1993 to the 
newly formed, 450-member State Duma (legislature), no single party 
or coalition achieved a clear majority or was able to broker a majority 
coalition.15 Yeltsin’s support coalition in this legislature included 
Russia’s Choice, the Russian Unity and Agreement Party, and the 
Democratic Party of Russia. Together these parties held only 22% of 
the Duma seats, hardly enough for a stable majority. By the time of the 
second State Duma elections in 1995, these three main parties in the 
pro-president, pro-government coalition had been re-organized and 
regrouped. The prime minister at the time, Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
founded his own center-right party, “Our Home is Russia,” which 
became the main pro-government party but which, in coalition with 
Democratic Russia’s Choice, still only held 18% of the Duma seats. This 
18% was not strongly united but rather included a heterogeneous set 
of centrists and reformers. In fact, Chernomyrdin’s only serious 
political power base was “his network of friends, allies, and clients in 
the oil and gas industries.”16 
Yevgeniy Primakov, the prime minister from September 1998 to 
May 1999, formed a coalition cabinet that included the Communist 
Party and enjoyed a majority in the State Duma. This majority was 
tentative; Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party, the 
largest party in the Duma, cautioned that the Communists would offer 
the Primakov government only “selective support.”17 Nevertheless, it 
was the first time in post-communist Russia’s history that a legislative 
majority had been built. Unfortunately for the performance of semi-
presidentialism in Russia, Primakov was unexpectedly sacked by 
Yeltsin in May 1999. Given this difficulty with building and sustaining 
party majorities, Russia has spent most of its early post-communist life 
 
15 See Brown, supra note 11 at 188 (arguing that these elections did not qualify as 
“founding elections” understood as the first multi-party elections in the transition 
from authoritarian rule. In 1993, the elections were at best “quasi-multiparty,” 
and were characterized by high voter apathy as well as strong support for 
nationalists and Communists.). 
16 Elena Chinyaeva & Peter Rutland, A Prime Minister Without Politics, 3 
Transition 32, 32–38 (1997). 
17 David McHugh, Shokhin Quits Cabinet After Ten Days, THE MOSCOW TIMES 
(Sept. 26, 1998). 
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in a constitutional place I call divided minority government. See Table 1. 
Importantly and problematically, Russia began its transition from 
communism from this very unfavorable starting point within the semi-
presidential constitution. And this, as I detail below, laid the 
foundations for today’s constitutional dictatorship under Vladimir 
Putin. 
So how did Russia’s prolonged placement in divided minority 
government complicate Moscow’s capacity to deal effectively and 
democratically with important tasks on its transition agenda? In the 
section that follows, I analyze three important episodes in post-
communist Russian politics. The first of these episodes was the 
political struggle between Boris Yeltsin and Ruslan Khasbulatov in 
September and October 1993. I discuss why, and in what ways, the 
political and constitutional conflict during this crucial period of the 
First Russian Republic was structurally similar to the periods of 
divided minority government in France in the 1950s and Weimar 
Germany in the 1920s. I then discuss how this struggle pre-empted 
reconciliatory politics and set a pattern of solving conflict through 
force, paving the way for a hyper-presidential administration, 
characterized by non-party cabinets and extensive policy-making by 
presidential decree. Second, I suggest that Russia’s military imbroglio 
in Chechnya from 1994 to 1995, and specifically Yeltsin’s declaration 
of war on the breakaway republic, was an undemocratic, presidential 
prestige strategy resulting from divided minority government, and of 
Yeltsin’s perception of victory over the legislature in 1993. I conclude 
with a discussion of Putin’s first presidency. I argue that in the wake 
of prolonged periods of divided minority government, Putin’s early 
efforts to recapture authority in Russia entrenched constitutional 
dictatorship, ultimately thwarting chances of constitutional 
democracy. 
Table 1: Electorally Generated Subtypes of Semi-
Presidentialism 
Russia 1991-1999 
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Consolidated 
Majority 
Divided Majority Divided Minority Non-Democratic 
Hyper- 
Presidentialism 
President and PM 
share the same 
majority in 
legislature 
PM has a legislative 
majority, president does 
not 
Sep. 1998-May 1999 
Neither PM nor 
president has a 
legislative majority 
June 1991-Sep. 1993 
Dec. 1993-Sep. 1998 
May 1999-May 2000 
(Sep.-Dec. 1993) 
0 Days 240 Days 2919 Days 83 Days 
 
I then return to the constitution itself and discuss why Russia could 
not meet the necessary conditions for consolidated majority 
government—the best place to be if you have a semi-presidential 
constitution and care about democracy. The data is based on archival 
work and interviews conducted in Moscow in the 1990s. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF 1993 AND YELTSIN’S USE 
AND ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
With the direct election of a powerful president in June 1991, post-
communist Russia—then officially known as the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.)—instituted a semi-
presidential constitutional framework and the First Russian 
Republic.18 Under this framework, the government was responsible 
 
18 See Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics 442 (Routledge 2020) (noting that the 
1978 Russian constitution served as the base document, and it “had been amended 
over 300 times, and the incremental nature of constitutional revision gave rise to 
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and accountable to the Russian Supreme Soviet, the chairman of which 
was the constitutional equivalent of a prime minister.19 This 
chairman’s powers included proposing candidates to the most 
important government posts and reporting to the Congress of People’s 
Deputies on all matters concerning the state of the federation, foreign 
and domestic affairs, and on defense and state security. These 
functions “were assigned to the chairman before the presidency was 
instituted in the Russian Federation, when the chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet . . . was ‘the highest official person’ in the Russian 
Republic.”20 In 1991, the president became the highest official of the 
federation. Herein lies the origin of the dual-executive structure, 
because “all other prerogatives of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet 
were left intact . . . [and now] many of the chairman’s powers 
overlapped [with] the powers of the president. The stage was set for 
collision.”21 
This particular Russian version of semi-presidentialism was 
described by Russian legal scholar, and former member of the 
Supreme Soviet, Alexander Yakovlev: 
With two power structures, each of which strove to 
obtain the age-old prize, “the totality of power,” a 
predictable rivalry developed. The rivalry became 
embodied in the persons of the president of the 
 
numerous contradictions, notably vesting supreme power in both the legislative 
and executive.”); see also Boris Nikolayevich Yelstin, Ispoved na zadannuiu temu 
(1990) (recounting reform in the later years of the Gorbachev period). 
19 See Bruce L. R. Smith, Law and Democracy in the New Russia 8 (Gennady M. 
Danilenko, 1993) (noting that the dual power structure was, even early in the 
R.S.F.S.R., thought of as “an incongruous arrangement that cannot function well 
over the long run.”). 
20 See Alexander M. Yakovlev et al., Striving for Law in a Lawless Land: Memoirs 
of a Russian Reformer 129 (M.E. Sharpe, 1996) (explaining that Yakovlev was a 
key advisor to Yeltsin’s hand-picked, constitutional committee, which drafted the 
December 1993 Russian Constitution, and, in 1994, Yakovlev was appointed the 
Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation to the 
Federal Assembly.). 
21 Alexander M. Yakolev, Striving for Law in a Lawless Land: Memoirs of a 
Russian Reformer 130 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1996). 
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Russian Federation and the chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet of the Russian Federation, who represented the 
two warring structures. Both structures had the right 
to promulgate acts that had the force of law. But who 
was above whom? Whose laws would prevail?22 
Constitutionally, both the president and the chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet could issue direct orders to government ministries and 
agencies.23 In addition, both the president and the Supreme Soviet 
could initiate bills, and the president had limited veto over bills 
proposed by the Supreme Soviet. The president also headed the 
Security Council of the Russian Federation, had the right to declare a 
state of emergency, and was commander in chief of the armed forces. 
However, the president was not given the right to dissolve the 
Congress or the Supreme Soviet. He could ask for the government’s 
resignation, but this request had to be confirmed by the Supreme 
Soviet. The fact that he was not given the right of dissolution, but that 
he did have direct command over the armed forces and could 
unilaterally declare a state of emergency, made the president 
dangerously sovereign without giving him recourse to normal 
democratic exits from conflictual situations.24 The Congress and the 
Supreme Soviet, for their part, could force a government’s resignation 
through a no confidence vote. Thus, the right of determining exit and 
the tools for resolving government crises before they became regime 
crises were awarded principally to the Congress and the Supreme 
Soviet, but not the president.25 It follows that the president under this 
constitutional structure had greater incentives to escalate conflict to a 
 
22 Id. at 140. 
23 Yitzhak M. Brudny, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Aleksandr Rutskoi, and Intraelite 
Conflict in Postcommunist Russia, 1991–1994, in PATTERNS IN POST-SOVIET 
LEADERSHIP 75, 86 (Timothy Colton & Robert Tucker eds., Westview Press, 
1995). 
24 John P. McCormick, CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM AGAINST 
POLITICS AS TECHNOLOGY 121–23 (Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
(“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception [Souverän ist, wer über den 
Ausnahmezustand entscheidet].”). 
25 Brudny, supra note 23, at 85. 
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state of emergency, which then gave him a constitutional tool for 
solving conflict. 
Eventually, political differences between the Russian president 
and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet escalated under this 
constitutional framework. Their differences concerned, for the most 
part, the timing and scope of economic reform. Both the president and 
the chairman had their own diverging ideas concerning the path out 
of communism, and particularly the path out of a command economy. 
The Supreme Soviet, for its part, had never been a complacent body. It 
had grown increasingly more assertive in trying to defend Russian 
sovereignty from the U.S.S.R., and later, in trying to maintain national 
cohesion in the face of centrifugal pulls from former autonomous 
ethnic territories and Russian-populated regions of the federation.26 
Importantly, a substantial faction of both the Supreme Soviet and the 
Congress of People’s Deputies had strong ties to state industry and 
collective and state farms, and this faction vehemently opposed any 
economic policy that could result in widespread privatization or even 
land reform. 
Boris Yeltsin, for his part, had also never been complacent. 
Yeltsin was elected in June 1991 with almost 60% of the valid votes. At 
this time, the economic crisis in Russia was severe: the budget deficit 
for 1991 was 26% of GDP, up from 8.5% in 1990.27 Yeltsin, promising 
to manage this crisis, was at the height of his popularity and was still 
on rather amicable terms with the R.S.F.S.R. Congress and Supreme 
Soviet. In this period, on November 1, 1991, Yeltsin convinced the 
Congress to grant him significant emergency powers for one year to 
deal with the economic crisis.28 Strong presidential powers were 
delegated to him, with the understanding that they could be revoked, 
 
26 Galina Starovoytova, “Sovereignty After Empire: Self-Determination 
Movements in the Former Soviet Union,” United States Institute of Peace, 
Working Paper No. 19 (November 1997). 
27 William Maley, The Shape of the Russian Macroeconomy, in RUSSIA IN SEARCH 
OF ITS FUTURE 48, 53 (Amin Saikal & William Maley eds., Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). 
28 Scott Parish, Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991-95, in EXECUTIVE 
DECREE AUTHORITY 62, 71–77 (John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
202 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 29 
by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.29 The powers included the right to enact 
special economic reforms by decree, to override previous legislation of 
the Russian Federation, to create or cancel all executive bodies of 
power, and to suspend any legal acts of local governments which 
violated the constitution, or violated the sovereignty of the Russian 
state, or both.30 The Supreme Soviet could overrule a presidential 
decree, but it had to do so within seven days of its original issue. 
Within the first year of Yeltsin’s term, there was little resistance 
to Yeltsin’s use of these powers. According to economists involved in 
Russia’s privatization, the Congress and Supreme Soviet did not at 
that time believe that Yeltsin would try to push through a serious and 
comprehensive privatization program that could affect state industries 
and state farms, and lead to bankruptcy and unemployment.31 In fact, 
Yeltsin had reassured the powerful Civic Union faction of the 
Congress that he held views on economic reform similar to those of the 
CU’s supporters—the industrial managers and workers.32 
But by December 1992, the situation was substantially 
different, as it became increasingly clear that Yeltsin was trying to 
implement a notoriously difficult and painful economic restructuring 
plan devised mainly by two young pro-market reformers, first his 
Finance Minister Yegor Gaydar, and then Boris Fedorov. Boris 
Fedorov “formulated a program for macroeconomic stabilization and 
tried to implement it in any way possible.”33 Prices were freed, trade 
was liberalized, defense expenditures were sharply cut, and large state 
firms were denied easy credits. Yeltsin and his reformers had support 
from several international financial institutions, such as the IMF and 
 
29 Stephen White, Russia: presidential leadership under Yeltsin, in 
POSTCOMMUNIST PRESIDENTS 38, 43–47 (Ray Taras ed., Cambridge University 
Press, 1997). 
30 Thomas F. Remington, Representative Power and the Russian State, in 
DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN AND POST-SOVIET POLITICS 57, 74–76 (Stephen 
White, Alex Pravda & Zvi Gitelman eds., Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1994). 
31 MAXIM BOYCKO, ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT VISHNY, PRIVATIZING RUSSIA 5 
(1995); cf. Moskovskie novosti (July 15, 1990). 
32 Keesings Record of World Events, 39201 (Nov. 3, 1992); see Boycko, Shleifer 
& Vishny, supra note 31, at 77. 
33 ANDERS ÅSLUND, HOW RUSSIA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY 55 (1995). 
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foreign lending banks, but the plan, and Yeltsin’s attempts to 
implement it, met with severe resistance from civil society and 
especially from a political society dominated by nomenklatura with ties 
to state enterprises. Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet at the time, was a main player in this resistance.34 The Supreme 
Soviet continued to block government legislation concerning 
privatization throughout the later part of 1992 and, “[a]s a result, every 
subsequent major regulation of privatization was introduced by 
Presidential decree rather than parliamentary action.”35 
Khasbulatov allied himself with the more conservative 
factions of the Congress and the Supreme Soviet, as well as with 
enterprise managers and communist reformers from the Gorbachev 
period. Their alliance was cemented by their shared anger and 
perception that they had all been left out of the detailed designing of 
reform which had been entrusted to a small group of young 
economists. This group—the so-called Gang of Four— “had no roots 
in a civil movement[.] [T]hey were there at the pleasure of the 
president.”36 The so-called Gang was mostly made up of young, free-
market minded academics, including Yegor Gaydar and Anatoliy 
Chubais. Yeltsin, following his constitutional prerogative, nominated 
one of this Gang of Four, Yegor Gaydar, Acting Prime Minister in 1992. 
Yeltsin then almost immediately agreed to demands by the Supreme 
Soviet that future nominees to the post of prime minister be approved 
by Congress, and that appointments to the so-called power 
ministries—security, foreign affairs, internal affairs, defense—be 
approved by the Supreme Soviet.37 
 
34 The availability of this external support coalition—outside of his own 
legislature and even outside of the boarders of his own country—was another 
factor which reduced Yeltsin’s incentives to build up his own internal support 
through political parties and social coalitions. The combination of Yeltsin’s 
increased decree power and this international coalition may explain why, despite 
Yeltsin’s apparent co-operation with the RSFSR legislature in 1991, severe 
conflict had arisen by 1992. 
35 Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, supra note 31. 
36 John Lloyd, REBIRTH OF A NATION: AN ANATOMY OF RUSSIA 219 (1998). 
37 The Constitutional Court appealed to Yeltsin, on one hand, and Rutskoy and 
Khasbulatov, on the other hand, to resolve their differences for the sake of 
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Yeltsin had hoped that this co-operative move would 
encourage the Congress to confirm Gaydar, however much the 
Congress and Supreme Soviet disliked him. The Congress instead 
rejected Gaydar and forced the appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
former Soviet Minister of Gas from 1985 to 1989, who had ties to state 
industry and was more sympathetic to a slower paced economic 
reform than Gaydar. In a further attempt to thwart Yeltsin’s economic 
program, the Supreme Soviet appointed Viktor Gerashchenko as 
chairman of the Central Bank of Russia on July 17, 1992.38 
Gerashchenko quickly instituted a loose credit policy for enterprises, a 
policy that fueled inflation, prevented or at least delayed many 
bankruptcies, and undercut the reformers’ economic “shock 
therapy.”39 
In early 1993, Fedorov managed to convince Gerashchenko 
and Chernomyrdin to issue a joint statement from the Central Bank 
and the Russian Government establishing quarterly credit ceilings. 
These ceilings were meant to help control the Central Bank’s monetary 
policy and, in turn, keep inflation down. By July 1993, however, 
Gerashchenko had broken the credit ceilings under pressure from the 
agricultural and northern regional lobbies. The Supreme Soviet, for its 
part, adopted a budget which called for a deficit of 25 percent of GDP, 
 
political and economic stability. After several rounds of face-to-face negotiations, 
Yeltsin and Khasbulatov decided to draft another constitution which would more 
strictly delineate presidential and legislative powers, to be voted on in an April 
1993 referendum. As the referendum approached, Rutskoy, the Constitutional 
Court and the Civil Union proposed a round table to draft the constitution. Yeltsin 
refused to take part. His former aide, Gennadiy Burbulis, commented that “…the 
experience of east European countries had shown that ‘the round table is a 
symptom of instability and not the right way to effect a change of authority.’” 
Keesings Record of World Events, 39201 (Nov. 3, 1992). 
38 See also YEGOR GAYDAR, DNI PORAZHENIY I POBED (1997) (stating that that 
the appointment of Gerashchenko, which the author originally supported, had 
been a major mistake). 
39 See ANDERS ÅSLUND, HOW RUSSIA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY, 191–92 
(Brookings Institution Press, 1st ed. 1995) (“The money supply (M2) increased 
by no less than 28 percent per month during the five months from June to October 
1992…[d]estabilization was rampant.”). 
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which Fedorov refused to endorse.40 Gerashchenko ignored Fedorov 
and government directives, and continued to print money to fund a 
budget deficit that “the Parliament seemed intent upon elevating to an 
irresponsible and unsustainable level.”41 On September 18, 1993, 
Yeltsin appointed Gaydar to the government as First Deputy Prime 
Minister and entrusted him once again with economic reform policy. 
A “war of words” ensued between the Russian president, the cabinet, 
the Russian Central Bank, and the Supreme Soviet. Public opinion 
polls conducted in June and July 1993, in the midst of this crisis, 
showed severe disappointment not only with the Russian economic 
system, but also with the political system for its inability to resolve the 
deadlock.42 
A report in Izvestiya on 10 September 1993 described this 
situation poignantly and is worth quoting at length: 
Dual power is becoming too onerous a burden for the 
country and the people. The split has long been 
moving rapidly downward from the federal level, 
penetrating the thick of our public life. We now have 
two of everything[.] Lines have been drawn in the 
creative unions. The speaker meets with his writers 
and the President with his. It won’t be long before we 
have two central television companies, two 
prosecutor’s offices, two supreme courts and two 
governments[.] Sociological measurements of public 
moods, not to mention one’s own daily experience, 
confirm that political apathy is on the rise. 
 
40 ANDERS ÅSLUND, HOW RUSSIA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY 191–92 
(Brookings Institution Press, 1st ed. 1995). 
41 William Maley, The Shape of the Russian Macroeconomy, in RUSSIA IN 
SEARCH OF ITS FUTURE, 57–58 (Amin Saikal & William Maley eds., 1995). 
42 See RICHARD ROSE, IRINA BOEVA AND VIACHESLAV SHIRONIN, HOW RUSSIANS 
ARE COPING WITH TRANSITION: NEW RUSSIAN BAROMETER II, 40 (Glasgow: 
University of Strathclyde Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1993) (On a scale 
of +100 (very positive) to –100 (very negative), the mean score Russians 
considered their system of government to be was –16). 
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People…are looking at what is happening at the top 
with bewilderment and disgust. They are demanding 
an end to the [institutional] war[.]43 
The fact that Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet both wanted to 
determine the timing and construction of the new political, economic 
and federal system is a logical consequence of the fact that they both 
had a constitutional right to do so. Conflict arose because these two 
executives had opposing political ambitions, were caught in an 
extremely inelastic economic situation, and could not count on the 
support of a clear and stable majority of deputies. Within two years, 
the situation had reached a point of no return: “[t]he two institutions, 
the Supreme Soviet and presidency, were locked in a struggle for 
victory which one or other had to win.”44 Eventually, this mnogovlastiye 
(multiplicity of powers) and dvoyevlastiye (dual power, such as that 
between president and legislature) led to “what many Russians 
preferred to term byezvlastiye, an absence of effective and legitimized 
power[.]”45 The result was a general vacuum of legitimacy in the 
political system.46 
This time, however, Yeltsin made sure that he would not have 
any interference from the Congress or Supreme Soviet. His 
appointment of Gaydar on September 18 was followed, three days 
later, by Presidential Decree 1400, which dissolved the Congress of 
People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, censored the press, leaned 
on the constitutional court, and called for new, nation-wide elections 
and a new constitution. The Congress responded by passing an 
impeachment motion against Yeltsin and inaugurating the then vice-
 
43 Yuri Orlik, What We Can Expect from the Russian President’s September 
Offensive, IZVESTIA, Sep. 10, 1993, at 10; see also Current Digest of the Post-
Soviet Press, Vol. XLV, No. 36 (1993), p. 11. 
44 John Lloyd, Rebirth Of A Nation: An Anatomy Of Russia, 35 (M. Joseph, 1st 
ed. 1998); see Vladislav M. Zubok, Russia: Between Peace and Conflict, in 
WHOSE WORLD ORDER? UNEVEN GLOBALIZATION AND THE END OF THE COLD 
WAR, 115 (Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sörensen eds., 1995). 
45 Archie Brown, The October Crisis of 1993: Context and Implications, in Post-
Soviet Affairs Vol. 9, No. 3, 183, 186 (1993). 
46 See also Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 7, 1993. 
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president, Aleksandr Rutskoy, as President of the R.S.F.S.R. A 
dramatic series of events followed. Yeltsin sent more than 2,000 troops 
to surround the Congress building, where deputies had closed 
themselves off in protest and defiance of the president, having access 
only to journalists’ portable cellphones to communicate with the 
public and the world about the situation. 
The public address which Yeltsin gave on September 22, 
attempting to justify this unilateral decision to close down the 
Congress, demonstrated his unwillingness to accept political 
opposition as legitimate, to respect the constitution and the right of 
other institutions to question, challenge, and even object to his own 
politics. In this address, Yeltsin claimed that the legislature “has been 
seized by a group of persons who have turned it into the staff of the 
irreconcilable opposition. Hiding behind deputies, this group is 
pushing Russia towards the abyss . . . [and it] has lost its right to be in 
control of crucial levers of state power.”47 
The fact that Yeltsin used force to solve the problem and 
frustrations of divided minority government had serious, negative 
implications for the rule of law and thus for Russia’s democratic 
transition.48 But the crucial point I would like to stress about this 
“September Offensive” is that it originated from divided minority 
government―that extremely frustrating situation of constitutionally 
granted power, on the one hand, and powerlessness due to a lack of 
legislative support, on the other hand. This makes one wonder 
whether the semi-presidential constitution, which combined 
presidential and parliamentary incentives, was a wise choice for a new 
state without a real party system. “The principles of parliamentary and 
presidential government are both equally valid, but the tragedy for 
Russia was that both were being pursued with equal vigor at the same 
 
47 Boris Yeltsin quoted in the Financial Times (London) 22 September 1993, p. 
2; see also Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 22, 1993, p. 1; and Khasbulatov’s 
response to Yeltsin’s decree in Rossiiskaya gazeta, September 23, 1993, p. 1. 
48 Archie Brown, Political Leadership in Post-Communist Russia, in RUSSIA IN 
SEARCH OF ITS FUTURE, 28–47, esp. 43–44 (Amin Saikal & William Maley eds., 
1995). 
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time: like two trains approaching on the same track, the collision 
would be disastrous for both.”49 
As the former Financial Times correspondent for Russia wrote, 
the September Offensive was “aimed at breaking the Gordian knot of 
political tensions and enmities now so large and tight that a chainsaw, 
not a sword, is required.”50 Indeed, the “Gordian knot” is an accurate 
description of divided minority government,  because institutional 
conflict becomes so intertwined and complicated in this subtype that 
it cannot simply be “undone,” but rather may encourage drastic 
solutions. Thus, divided minority government is likely to lead out of 
the democratic box, into non-democratic, presidential dominance and 
extensive use of emergency and decree powers. Empirical evidence 
tells us that indeed, Yeltsin decided to solve the dilemma of divided 
minorities this way: by unilaterally closing down the legislature, 
restricting the operation of the constitutional court, censoring the 
media, and ruling by decree with a small group of hand-picked 
advisors. Yeltsin’s unilateral action can be likened to that of Alexander 
the Great in the fable of the Gordian knot, who favored drastic action 
over cautious deliberating. As Yeltsin himself wrote, “[i]f the 
parliament does not exist, there is not, there must not be, any dialogue 
with it.”51 
In the aftermath of the September Offensive, Boris Yeltsin 
called for a new constitution to be drawn up and put to a national 
referendum.52 Yeltsin took complete control of this constitutional 
process.53 Backed by the popular support he received in a “plebiscite” 
 
49 RICHARD SAKWA, RUSSIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 48 (3d ed. 2002). 
50 John Lloyd, Rock Solid Against Yeltsins’ Reforms, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(LONDON), Sept. 6, 1993, at 21. 
51 John Lloyd, Yeltsin Confident As Direct Rule Wins Military Support, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 23, 1993, at 1 (quoting Boris Yeltsin). 
52 It was actually called a plebiscite and not a referendum in order to avoid the law 
on referendums. See Michael Dobbs, Yeltsin Challenges His Foes In Congress, 
Calls For Referendum, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 1992), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/12/11/yeltsin-challenges-his-foes-in-
congress-calls-for-referendum/1ad742d4-821f-4f48-96b0-1a80b4c66db1. 
53 Izvestiya [Constitution], July 16, 1993, at 3–6; cf. Izvestiya [Constitution], Nov. 
10, 1993, at 3–5. 
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in April 1993, which in reality had the effect of a referendum, Yeltsin 
believed he had been given a carte blanche popular mandate to write 
this constitution. In this referendum, nearly 59% of those voting (but 
only 38% of the electorate) said they had confidence in Yeltsin.54 “For 
Yeltsin and his supporters this was a verdict that justified pressing 
ahead with a constitution that provided for a presidential republic 
with a much more limited legislature, and by the end of that year they 
had obtained that objective.”55 
The process of drafting, discussing and approving a new 
constitution is extremely important in the constitutional moments of 
transitional democracies. Elites have, in these moments, a chance to 
demonstrate their democratic commitment to the nation.56 The more 
transparent and plural the constitution-making process is, the more 
respect shown by the new leaders—not only for the democratic ideal, 
but for the citizens qua citizens of the nation. In the ideal constitution-
making environment, a democratically elected constituent assembly 
freely debates and discusses different draft-constitutions, attempts to 
decide difficult or contentious points through consensual rather than 
majoritarian mechanisms, and submits the final draft to a referendum 
for legitimization by a clear majority of the electorate.57 Usually a new 
democracy meets some to most of these conditions. Spain, in 1979, 
met all of them. Russia, in 1993, met none. Yeltsin drew up the 1993 
Constitution under an opaque veil, since there was no election of a 
constituent assembly. 
Indeed, the legislature played no role in drafting or approving 
the constitution. Even the first draft by Yeltsin’s hand-picked 
constitutional committee was discarded, apparently because it 
 
54 White, Rose & MacAllister, How Russia Votes, Table 4.2 (1997). 
55 Id. at 46. 
56 See Jon Elster, Afterword: The Making of Postcommunist Presidencies, in 
Postcommunist Presidents 225–37 (1997); Juan J. Linz, Introduction: Some 
Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe, in Postcommunist 
Presidents 1–14 (1997). 
57 The requirements for an ideal constitution-making environment have been 
previously evaluated. See LINZ & STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION 81–83 (1978) (of all the countries treated here, 
only Spain in 1979 met the criteria.). 
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restricted presidential power and gave more power to the 
legislature.58 Yeltsin’s final document was submitted to a plebiscite, 
and Yeltsin later argued that it had been approved in a “referendum” 
by the required majority of votes. In reality, however, there was a very 
low turnout rate for this national consultation. Official figures claimed 
that turnout was about 54%, but even if this were true, that meant 
that the constitution was actually only approved, and this 
legitimized, by 31% of the electorate.59 Some observers even doubt 
whether the 50% requirement had really been met. 
What were the main elements of this constitution, drafted in 
secrecy and approved by only 31% of the Russian electorate? Russia’s 
1993 constitution can be considered a variation towards a strongly 
presidential semi-presidential system, both de jure and de facto. That is, 
constitutional powers are significantly unbalanced in favor of the 
president. The president enjoys significant legislative-initiative and 
legislative-blocking power and has rather free-handed decree power. 
The constitution simply states, for example, that “the president of the 
Russian Federation issues decrees and directives” (Article 90.1), 
which are “mandatory throughout the territory” (Art. 90.2) and which 
“must not contravene the constitution of the Russian Federation and 
federal laws” (Art. 90.3).60 This means that almost no objections can 
legally be made to presidential decrees, nor any limits placed on their 
frequency. 
Moreover, the one body that can decide whether or not a 
presidential decree contravenes the constitution or federal law is the 
Constitutional Court, the judges of which must be chosen by the 
Federation Council from the candidates submitted by the president 
(Art 83.f). Only presidential decrees concerning the introduction of 
martial law, or a state of emergency must be “confirmed” by the 
Federation Council (Art. 102.b, c). The requirements   concerning this 
 
58 Interview with Galina Starovoytova, Member of this Constitutional Committee 
in 1993, in Moscow (Mar. 26, 1998). 
59 See WHITE, ROSE & MCALLISTER, A WEAK YES FOR A CONSTITUTION IN HOW 
RUSSIA VOTES, 87, 106 (1997). 
60 JOHN LLOYD, REBIRTH OF A NATION: AN ANATOMY OF RUSSIA, 105-06 (M. 
Joseph ed., 1st ed. (1998). 
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confirmation are ambiguous given the president a wide scope 
regarding what situations constitute national emergencies, as in 
Weimar Germany.61 
In general, some checks to presidential power by the 
government, the Constitutional Court, the State Duma, and the 
Federation Council do exist, but the language concerning necessary 
countersignature from these bodies is often ambiguous. Moreover, the 
checks to presidential power often involve complicated procedures.62 
For example, impeachment of the president is only possible on the 
basis of a charge of treason or “grave crime.” This charge must be filed 
by at least one-third of the State Duma’s total membership, confirmed 
by a ruling of the Supreme Court, confirmed by a ruling of the 
Constitutional Court, confirmed by a ruling of a special committee of 
the State Duma, and approved by two-thirds of the total membership 
of both the State Duma and the Federation Council. All these 
procedures, and the final ruling by the Federation Council, must take 
place within three months of the initial filing of the charge by the State 
Duma, otherwise the charge against the president is rejected. 
Another crucial power awarded to Yeltsin in the 1993 
constitution comes from Article 85.1, which allows the president of 
the Russian Federation to use “conciliation procedures to resolve 
disagreements” between the center and the federal units.63 Using this 
power, Yeltsin was able to grant special “semi-autonomous” status to 
Tatarstan, allowing Tatarstan to regulate its own trade and establish 
its own state bank. Treaties between the Kremlin and other republics, 
oblasts and krais followed. Such bilateral deals may have been 
necessary for mitigating inter-elite tensions and may have helped 
avoid the type of bloodshed witnessed in Chechnya’s secession war 
with Moscow. But these bilateral treaties also appear to be working 
against the development of a democratic federation in which the 
subunits are able to protect themselves from transgressions by the 
center, because “…the pervasiveness of the federal government’s web 
 
61 See Maurice Duverger, Les régimes semi-présidentiels, 13 (1987). 
62 See Colton, Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s All-Thumbs Democrat, 49-74 (1995). 
63 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, App. 3 (London: Routledge, 
1996). 
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of bilateral deals with the regions—epitomized by the bilateral 
treaties—amounts to a selective provision of private goods that 
effectively substitutes for the public goods that might create incentives 
for inter-regional collective action.”64 
Several presidential powers are checked by the Federation 
Council rather than by the State Duma.65 Again, this was Yeltsin’s 
preference. Realizing the need for majority support and noting the 
simultaneous lack of such support in the State Duma, Yeltsin arranged 
this prerogative to be given to the Federation Council. The Federation 
Council was composed at the time of very few political party 
representatives and was instead dominated by independent regional 
elites who generally favored Yeltsin’s politics because they had been 
appointed by him.66 From 1995 to 2000, members of the upper house 
were chosen from the heads of executive and legislative governments 
in each of the 89 regions, which were themselves chosen through 
competitive elections. In elections that took place for governors during 
2000, twenty-eight of the forty-four winners were incumbents. None 
was openly critical of the Kremlin. As of July 2000, governors agreed 
to surrender their seats in the Federation Council to representatives 
who would sit on the council for them. Some analysts feel that this 
body, which should provide an important check to the power of the 
Kremlin, and which has so far been rather supportive of Kremlin 
policies, is now in danger of extinction in the face of an extremely 
strong president. The relative strength of the Russian president 
becomes apparent when we compare it to other semi-presidential 
systems. If we measure the de jure powers of the presidents of Russia, 
the French Fifth Republic, and Weimar Germany, we note that the 
Russian president is constitutionally almost twice as powerful as the 
president of the French Fifth Republic, and at least one- third more 
powerful than the president of the Weimar Republic. 
 
64 Steven L. Solnick, Hanging Separately? Cooperation, Cooptation, and 
Cheating in Developing Federations, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association in Boston, MA (Sep. 3–6, 1998). 
65 See Viiktor Sheinis, Moscow News No. 46, (Nov. 12, 1993). 
66 RFE/RL Research Report (Feb. 4, 1994). 
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At first glance, this comparative data would seem to support 
arguments that strong presidential powers are related to democratic 
breakdown. However, the crafting of such strong presidential powers 
into the 1993 Russian Constitution must be seen as a consequence of 
Yeltsin’s experience with divided minority government. Moreover, in 
spite of these strong de jure powers, Yeltsin often found himself quite 
impotent, because he lacked a coherent Duma majority. It was from 
this position of impotence that he often resorted to appointing non-
party ministers that were loyal only to him; to sacking prime ministers 
at whim, even when they proved to be working cooperatively with 
the Duma; and to ruling extensively by decree, as a substitute for a 
Duma majority. In addition, if we look at Weimar Germany, the 
president was much less powerful than in Russia, and only slightly 
more powerful than in France. Yet, Russia has managed to move back 
from hyper- presidentialism, whereas Weimar never could. Thus, the 
de jure powers of presidents alone cannot explain democratic 
breakdown. 
One can make a plausible argument that in spite of the 
frustration from this impotence, Yeltsin managed to keep his autocratic 
tendencies at bay and thus keep Russia from moving completely and 
permanently into the non-democratic box through his “very sensitive 
instinct (rather than other capacity) about how far he can go in either 
direction.”67 This perhaps allowed him to toe the fine line between 
authoritarian rule (which would prevent him from staying on 
amicable terms with the Group of Seven, NATO and the EU) and 
democracy (which might, given legislative and social opposition to 
economic reforms, have made him cut economic reform programs.) 
International monetary organizations, such as the IMF, have had 
rather unrealistic expectations with respect to the Russian economy. 
But Russian society has also been somewhat unrealistic in terms of its 
expectations. 
Indeed, after Yeltsin’s overwhelming victory and surge of popular 
support in the 1991 election, he did have, at that time, a window of 
 
67 Andrey Grachev, “Russian Society: Which Way out of Communism?”, 
Presentation at the Russian and East European Centre Seminar at St Antony’s 
College, Oxford, (Oct. 20, 1997). 
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opportunity. He might have attempted to change the historical legacy 
in Russia of a highly centralized, cult of personality-type political 
leadership, towards a democracy built upon the sovereignty of the 
people represented in legislature. In this window of opportunity, 
Yeltsin might have attempted to legitimate the legislature, establishing 
it as an important democratic institution. What would have happened 
if a different constitutional structure had been chosen in 1991? As 
Stephen White argues, “[f]or Khasbulatov, Russian history, and then 
Marxism-Leninism had combined to exaggerate the power of a single 
‘tsar.’” Therefore, it was essential, in these circumstances, to establish 
a secure division of powers and then to develop the role of parliament 
as a ‘representative organ’ of the whole society. Parliament, in 
particular, could serve as a ‘counterweight’ to the executive, 
exercising its influence over public spending, legislation, and the 
composition of government as parliaments did in other countries.68  
Yeltsin did not, however, accept the challenge of developing and 
fortifying an institutional counterweight to his own power. Let me now 
discuss several episodes that illustrate how Yeltsin instead led Russia 
to hyper-presidentialism. 
III. THE CHECHEN CRISIS 
Chechnya claimed full independence from the Russian Federation 
on March 12, 1992, under the leadership of its president, General 
Dzhokhar Dudaev.69 Immediately following Chechnya’s declaration, 
Yeltsin followed suit by imposing a state of emergency in the region 
and sending Russian troops to Grozny, the Chechen capital. The 
Russian Supreme Soviet refused to approve Yeltsin’s decree, these 
troops were immediately withdrawn, and for the two and a half years 
 
68 But cf. Stephen White et al., How Russia Votes 46, 47 (1997) (discussing mixed 
popular support for a “strong leader who could make decisions and put them 
quickly into effect” as opposed to “parliament and elections.”). 
69 NEW STATES, NEW POLITICS: BUILDING THE POST-SOVIET NATIONS 712 (Ian 
Bremmer & Ray Taras eds., 1997) (In 1989, the Russian population in Chechen-
Ingushetia were a minority (22%), while Chechens, were a majority (55%). A 
remaining 12% were Ingush, 1% Armenian, 1% Ukrainian, and 9% “others”). 
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that followed, Russia pursed a policy of peaceful co-existence with 
Chechnya.70 Then on December 11, 1994, one year after Yeltsin had 
shelled his own legislature and orchestrated the adoption of a 
constitution that gave him strong powers, he again sent Russian troops 
into Chechnya. This time, neither the State Duma, nor the 
Constitutional Court, nor the Federation Council, was asked to 
approve Yeltsin’s declaration. Russian public opinion polls showed 
a 65% disapproval rate for the use of force in Chechnya, but public 
opinion was ignored.71 Within the Chechen Republic, Russian 
troops committed gross violations of human rights and repeatedly 
breached international humanitarian law.72 Most of the Russian 
media’s accounts of the Chechen War were distorted by government 
censorship.73 
What led to the Kremlin’s decision to declare war on this break-
away federal state, especially given that the overwhelming consensus 
in the State Duma, as well as the majority of the public, were strongly 
against the use of force? Moreover, why did the Kremlin pursue a 
policy of peaceful co-existence with Chechnya from 1991 until 1994, 
and then breach co-existence violently in 1994? The Russian military 
intervention of Chechnya must be seen in the context of the September-
 
70 See generally Gail W. Lapidus, Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of 
Chechnya, 23 Int’l Sec. 5, 15–16 (1998) (discussing Yeltsin’s aborted military 
intervention in Chechnya). 
71 See generally Leonid Nikitinsky, Frustrated Generals Take Aim at Journalists, 
Moscow News (Feb. 3, 1995), https://advance-lexis-com.access.library.miami.
edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJF-1SR0-0061-K1J
H-00000-00&context=1516831 (discussing the information war between Russian 
generals and independent journalist reporting on the Chechen Campaign). 
72 See generally Svante E. Cornell, International Reactions to Massive Human 
Rights Violations: The Case of Chechnya, 51 Eur.-Asia Stud. 85, 87–91 (1999) 
(discussing human rights abuses in Chechnya during Russia’s Chechen 
Campaign). 
73 See Nikitinsky, supra note 71; see also NATIONS IN TRANSIT 1997: CIVIL 
SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY AND MARKETS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE 
NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES 318–20 (Adrian Karatnycky et al. eds., 1997) 
(suggesting that the media is still censored by the federal and regional 
governments and the courts). 
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December 1993 crisis, the year prior to the intervention, considering 
the anticipation of the presidential elections of 1996. It must be seen in 
the context of divided minority government. 
In the face of increasing nationalist sentiments in the electorate, 
and increased dissatisfaction with the economy, Chechnya presented 
an opportunity for Yeltsin and the reformers in 1994. “By the time of 
the Chechen crisis, the power group exhausted itself in domestic and 
foreign policies…,” and Yeltsin needed to find some prestige strategy 
to re- legitimize his use of exceptional powers and extended use of 
presidential decrees.74 Just one year earlier, Yeltsin had solved the 
showdown with the Russian legislature unilaterally, through the use of 
force. In the end, he achieved his goal (a constitution granting him 
substantial powers which dwarfed those of the legislature in 
comparison) and prestige in the international community for having 
saved Russia from the apparent threat of reactionary forces. This 
support from the international community gave Yeltsin an inflated 
sense of his actual domestic legitimacy: having won the game he 
played with the Russian legislature in 1993 through force, Yeltsin must 
have felt that the same technique could be successfully used again in 
Chechnya. After all, “Yeltsin found out that knots are easier to cut than 
to untie,” and thus, “he doesn’t even want to try to untie them.”75 
Another motivation Yeltsin had for engaging in war with 
Chechnya as a prestige strategy was the fact that the 1993 elections to 
the State Duma gave the relatively unknown Vladimir Zhirinovsky 
and his nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, which had as a top policy 
priority the restoration of the former Soviet empire, 23% of the 
popular vote for the PR elections and a total of 14% of the Duma 
seats.76  These results suggested an increasing popularity of nationalist 
ideas in the electorate, and “…demonstrated to Yeltsin’s Kremlin of 
 
74 Mikhail Gorbachev, Moscow News No. 1, 3 (Jan. 6, 1995). 
75 Interview with Sergey Kovalev in Moscow (Mar. 26, 1998). 
76 BRUCE D. PORTER, RUSSIA AND EUROPE AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE 
INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES (Celeste A. Wallander, ed.); 
The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, 135 (Boulder: 
Westview Press, ed., 1996); see also Election data from White, Rose and 
McAllister, How Russia Votes, p. 123. 
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advisers that Yeltsin had to change his liberal image, rhetoric, and 
allies in order to win the next presidential election.”77 That is, 
“[t]hroughout 1993 and most clearly after the defeat of reformist 
parties in the December elections, politicians in the Yeltsin camp were 
compelled to pay greater attention to the views of the nationalist 
right—especially on the question of Russian minorities in the former 
Soviet republics.”78 In this context, at least two incentives emerging 
from the semi-presidential institutions— the conflict structured 
between the two executives which led to an ever-escalating struggle 
for power, and the need to win crises to improve chances for 
presidential re-election—seem to have been crucial in Yeltsin’s 
decision to intervene militarily in Chechnya in 1994.79 One close 
advisor to Yeltsin sincerely believed that Yeltsin wanted a war for 
prestige reasons, and that “Yeltsin even calculated that it would only 
take him eight days to win this war.”80 
 
77 Michael McFaul, A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of 
Russian Foreign Policy, 22 (3) MIT Int’l Security 5, 28-29 (1998). 
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persuaded Yeltsin to jettison his liberal image, supporters, and advisers in favor 
of a more nationalist and authoritarian strategy and greater reliance on hardline 
political figure[s].”). 
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The final decision to invade Chechnya was taken only by Yeltsin, 
and “[t]he nature of the decision-taking on the war was fatally cast in 
the mold of the Byzantine court Yeltsin had created, or allowed to be 
created, around him—and in this case, no liberal voices were allowed 
to penetrate.”81 This was the culmination of a process that Yeltsin had 
gradually created since 1992, in his drive to centralize decision making 
and keep it vertical, directly under his administration. The Foreign 
Ministry, although not originally concerned with Chechnya, was 
stripped of some of its co-ordination duties. These duties were placed 
in the lap of the Russian Security Council, which was already part 
of the presidential administration and under direct supervision of the 
president.82 
As mentioned earlier, public opinion on the war in Chechnya was 
ignored.83 Opinion polls conducted in the summer of 1994, several 
months before the invasion, showed that only  5% of those polled 
believed that “Moscow must at any price—including the use of force—
preserve Chechnya within the Russian Republic.”84 However, the 
decision to invade and carry out a war with the Chechen Republic was 
made independently of public opinion, and for that matter, 
independently of the State Duma, and of the major liberal forces 
in Russia.85 One might wonder why Yeltsin, if he was indeed 
pursuing a prestige strategy, 
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ignored public opinion and risked alienating his support base. His 
moves seem counterintuitive, especially since two of the major pro-
reform parties in the State Duma which generally supported Yeltsin, 
Yavlinski’s Yabloko and Russia’s Choice, were also strongly opposed 
to Yeltsin’s decision on Chechnya, and regarding it as a move 
toward authoritarian presidentialism.86 
Members of the Russian cabinet also resisted the war. 
Several of them, including Russian Minister of Justice Yuri 
Kalmykov, chose to resign rather than individually or collectively 
challenge Yeltsin.87 Sergey Kovalev, Yeltsin’s advisor on human 
rights and member of Yeltsin’s presidential council, also resigned. In 
his letter of resignation to Yeltsin he included a strong criticism of the 
conflict, which he tied back to the constitutional tensions. And “[l]ater, 
after he had himself been comprehensively bloodied in Chechnya, 
Kovalev reflected: ‘I had been thinking in straight lines. I could not 
see that dissolution of parliament [in 1993] led to Chechnya.’”88 In his 
letter, Kovalev stated his disgust with the Chechen crisis, pointing to 
what he felt was a missed opportunity to push the country on the road 
to democracy. He laid blame for the failure directly with Yeltsin: 
In this conflict we have seen in full measure contempt 
for the law, flouting of the constitution...what is 
particularly horrifying is another aspect of the régime 
you’ve created, which has been revealed by this crisis: 
utter contempt for human life...The totalitarian order, 
which was dealt a serious but possibly not fatal blow, 
is defending itself...Your personal guilt lies in 
encouraging these tendencies instead of checking 
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them. It’s sad for me that you have lost your soul, that 
you are unable to evolve from a Communist Party 
secretary into a human being. You could have done 
so.89 
Strong opposition to the war in Chechnya was even evident from 
the Russian Minister of Defense, General Pavel Grachev, who, it was 
said later by insiders, did not really want to go to war. Though 
desperately unpopular and relatively inexperienced, he was enough 
of a soldier to realize the problems. But he was trapped in a 
particularly hard place; and he volunteered his men in much the same 
spirit as a Stalin-era tractor plant director might have pledged to 
double output.90 Of course, the war in Chechnya was a complicated 
and multi-faceted conflict that cannot be reduced to having any single 
cause. However, in light of the empirical evidence in this section, it 
seems that Yeltsin’s use of force in Chechnya was indeed a strategy 
aimed at re-legitimizing his authority in the absence of a presidential 
majority. His idea was to create, and then solve, a major crisis. If 
Yeltsin did indeed operate under such a logic, it would explain why 
he would ignore public opinion on the war, believing that the public 
was wrong and that they needed to be led by someone who, “…as the 
personal embodiment of the popular will that cannot be procedurally 
ascertained in a time of crisis, has the authority to act—
unconstitutionally or even anti-constitutionally—with all the force and 
legitimacy of that originally popular will.”91 In this way, Russia’s war 
with Chechnya was a demonstration of hyper-presidentialism that 
developed out of the conflictual divided minority government. Now let 
me discuss a process that further demonstrates Russia’s movement 
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toward non-democratic hyper-presidentialism: the technocratization 
of the Russian cabinets under Yeltsin. 
IV. THE TECHNOCRATIZATION OF CABINETS UNDER YELTSIN 
UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1998 
As I discussed earlier, one of the probable outcomes of the conflict 
in divided minority government is a move towards more 
autocratic, presidential domination of decision-making. I submit 
that this move is often characterized by the gradual technocratization of 
cabinets, in which ministers appointed are not members of parties, but 
rather, are non- party specialists chosen for their expertise in a specific 
technical field (usually economics). The technocratization of cabinets 
was popular in Latin America, when several countries in the region 
embarked upon the difficult path of economic adjustment.92 While the 
inclusion of such non-party experts in government can be important 
for assuring informed, specialized decision-making, appointing 
technocrats to head government ministries may not be particularly 
conducive to democratic consolidation, especially when it excludes 
parties   from   government   and   narrows   the   decision-making   
process   to   non-party specialists.93 In effect, technocratization 
unlinks the cabinet from the legislature. Jean Blondel and Maurizio 
Cotta’s study of eleven consolidated democracies found that in the 
model of democratic government, “parties provide the pool of 
eligibles, the people with long party careers among whom candidates 
for government positions are to be selected, while [parties] control 
also the selection (and deselection) process[s].”94 In presidential 
systems, a president is free to choose his cabinet without having 
to worry about the legislature’s confidence in the cabinet. In 
parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, however, the 
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legislature’s lack of confidence in the cabinet can terminate it, and thus, 
choosing party members for the cabinet, preferably party members 
with good ties to the legislature, can be very important for the efficacy 
and even the survival of the government. In Russia, President Boris 
Yeltsin increasingly appointed technocrats to government posts—a 
dangerous practice for democracy which began to reverse itself 
somewhat with the appointment of Prime Minister Yevgeniy 
Primakov. Vladimir Mau, former close aide to Gaydar and Chief of the 
Economic Reform Center in Moscow, admitted that Russia in the early 
1990s could easily be described as “constitutional authoritarianism,” 
partly because “there’s no such thing as a government majority [in 
Russia]. We have purely presidential government. They [the ministers] 
are the ministers of the president.”95 
On March 23, 1998, Yeltsin dismissed the cabinet in a “surprise” 
decree, claiming that Russia needed a cabinet with renewed energy 
and life, meaning that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin had not pushed 
economic reform far enough.96 Yeltsin’s snap decision came as a 
surprise even to Chernomyrdin.97 Yeltsin then nominated Sergey 
Kiriyenko to fill the post, a 35-year-old from Nizhny Novgorod who 
was not an active member of any political party, but rather, was 
known for his economic and managerial skills in one of Russia’s 
regions. Yeltsin’s nomination of Kiriyenko met with very strong 
resistance from the Duma, where the nomination had to be approved. 
Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party, was the strongest 
opponent to the nomination. The Communists’ usual allies, the 
Agrarians, mainly supported Kiriyenko, not for his programme, but 
rather, on the grounds that a rejection of Kiriyenko and a resulting 
presidential dissolution of the Duma would allow Yeltsin to govern for 
several months exclusively by decree. According to Article 111 of the 
Russian constitution, “[f]ollowing three rejections by the State Duma 
of candidates submitted for the head of the government of the Russian 
Federation, the president of the Russian Federation appoints a head of 
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the government of the Russian Federation, dissolves the State Duma 
and schedules new elections.”98 
Moreover, Duma members were averse to a dissolution because 
it would have meant giving up the benefits that came with Duma 
seats, which included subsidized government apartments, cars and 
travel.99 The Communists managed to reject the nomination of 
Kiriyenko in the first two rounds of voting, trying to persuade Yeltsin 
to nominate another candidate. Yeltsin called their bluff and 
nominated Kiriyenko a third (and final) time, and most of the parties 
acquiesced in Yeltsin’s decision and approved Kiriyenko. However, 
the tension that mounted between Yeltsin and the Duma over 
Kiriyenko’s approval meant that, although Kiriyenko was finally 
approved, he did not have very much support in the daily politics of 
the Duma, and he was considered to be somewhat of an intrusion in 
their affairs. This is completely contrary to the premise of 
parliamentary government, where a prime minister depends on 
parliament for his support. As Kiriyenko himself admitted: “I don’t 
owe anything to anybody, except to the president.”100 
Yeltsin replaced the rest of the cabinet with mostly young 
technocrats, which for some analysts “…confirms that President Boris 
Yeltsin intends to remodel the government not as a force in its own 
right, but as a non-political economic bureau of the Kremlin.”101 Most 
ministers had no political affiliation and faced a Duma majority 
opposed to the kind of tax reform program that the Kiriyenko 
government tried to develop. Important business tycoons who 
controlled state resources, such as Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir 
Potanin, resisted the Kiriyenko governments’ reforms from the 
beginning, because at the simplest level, improved tax collection and 
tax reform would have reduced their profits. In addition, the financial 
oligarchs who controlled the most important banks in Russia expected 
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the government to print money to prop up the fledging Russian 
banking system. Thus, by August 1998, the Russian government was 
in deep financial trouble, did not have the political support it needed 
from the Duma to reform the tax system, and was under strong 
pressure from those in control of state resources to print money 
and pursue a stronger industrial policy—the exact contrary to the 
liberal reforms some experts argued were necessary to save the 
economy from “sliding into the abyss.”102 The government called for 
simultaneous rouble devaluation and default on its US $40 billion 
obligations to Russian and Western holders of its high-yield treasury 
bills. 
On August 23, Yeltsin sacked the entire Kiriyenko government, 
shielding himself from responsibility for the economic crisis. 
Quibbling between Yeltsin and the State Duma over the appointment 
of a new, mutually acceptable prime minister took several weeks, 
during which time the rouble continued to lose value. As Chrystia 
Freeland of the Financial Times wrote, “[a]s the political establishment 
haggles…the whole economy may be burning down.”103 Yeltsin 
eventually nominated Viktor Chernomyrdin for the post, but he was 
defeated twice in the Duma. On September 11, in Yeltsin’s third and 
final chance, the former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, 
Yevgeniy Primakov, was confirmed by the Duma in a vote of 315 to 
63.104 Several important ministers appointed to this Primakov 
government by presidential decree had no political affiliation. These  
included the ministers of Health, Culture, Education and Regional 
Policy, who were “[a]ll primarily professionals rather than politicians 
who will follow a party line.”105 Mikhail Zadornov of Yabloko was 
kept on as Finance Minister. Yuri Masliukov, a Duma deputy from the 
Communist Party, was chosen as First Deputy Prime Minister, 
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bringing the Communists into a coalition government that enjoyed a 
majority in the Duma—a first in post-communist history. The 
increasingly assertive Primakov, who enjoyed considerable support in 
the Duma, thus moved Russia into divided majority government, 
where it remained for almost nine months. Eventually, Yeltsin became 
wary of Primakov’s growing popularity, both within the Duma and in 
the general population, and dismissed him in May 1999. 
Why is this pattern problematic? History again provides the 
example. The initial technocratization of the Russian cabinet is similar 
to Weimar during the last years of the Republic (1930-1933). President 
Hindenburg was an anti-party president, much like Yeltsin. As the 
economic situation worsened in 1930, Hindenburg appointed an 
increasing number of technocrats to Weimar’s cabinets, and the 
legislature (much like the Russian Duma) gradually began to abdicate 
responsibility to Hindenburg, refusing to pass votes of no-confidence 
which would have either (1) forced them to take the reins in a divided 
minority government, with all the difficulties that implied, or (2) 
resulted in a legislative dissolution by the president. Therefore, 
legislative parties under the last years of the Weimar Republic 
avoided their responsibility to check presidential power and 
instead tolerated presidential cabinets made up of non-party 
technocrats (Fachkabinette). If we compare the party affiliations of the 
eight main cabinet ministers under Ebert and Hindenburg, Ebert’s 
party (the Social Democratic Party or SPD) held the plurality (27%) of 
the ministries over his tenure, while over Hindenburg’s tenure, the 
plurality (37%) of  the major cabinet positions were held by non-party 
technocrats, more than any other single party. In fact, von Papen and 
von Schleicher were the last two prime ministers to be appointed 
before Hitler, and both were non-party prime ministers. And most 
importantly, very similar to Yeltsin, Hindenburg sacked his coalition-
building prime minister (Brüning) prematurely. In Russia just before 
his dismissal, Primakov had been trying, with the support of a 
legislative majority, to exercise more control over government 
policymaking and encourage constitutional reform that would make 
the president less powerful vis-à-vis the government and the Duma. 
Had Primakov had a longer time horizon, a reasonable counter-factual 
could be made that Primakov might have been successful in some of 
these important reform efforts. 
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Of course, both the historical circumstances and the international 
context are quite different in Russia now than they were for Germany 
in 1933. Certainly, Yeltsin’s considerations of the IMF loan policies 
kept his political behavior within certain limits. Nevertheless, the 
autocratic, unpredictable tendencies in Yeltsin’s personality have been 
brought out by the incentives in semi-presidentialism. He towed the 
line between some semblance of transitional democratic semi-
presidentialism—which kept him on acceptable grounds with the 
international community—and outright autocratic rule, which 
allowed him and his technocratic cabinets to dominate policymaking. 
But in the long run, Yeltsin’s domination prevented Russia from 
moving more consistently toward democracy and toward a more 
stable and workable semi-presidentialism founded upon strong 
legislative majorities. 
Surveys conducted in Russia in 1996 found “[t]hat rising 
dissatisfaction with the political system was due to fears over rising 
crime, the injustices involved in the privatization programme, 
embarrassment over continued political instability, and feelings of 
political inefficac[y]”106 This dissatisfaction with the political system in 
Russia is exemplified through low levels of participation, as evidenced 
by the steady decrease in voter turnout over the last few years.107 In a 
nation-wide survey conducted by VTsIOM in 1999, 63% of 
respondents characterized the political situation in Russia as a “rise of 
anarchy.” In another poll that year, 58% of respondents felt that 
everything in Russia would have been better off if the country had 
remained as it was prior to 1985.108 Other foundational building blocks 
of democracy already suffer from a lack of trust on the part of citizens. 
A public opinion poll taken in early 1998 by the Centre for the Study 
of Public Policy asked people to rank Russian institutions on a trust 
scale of 1 (no trust) to 7 (great trust). 81% of the people answering this 
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poll expressed low to no trust scores (1,2 or 3) for political parties; 70% 
expressed a low to no trust score for the legislature and 72% for Yeltsin. 
These scores were slightly worse for parties and parliament than they 
were for the elements of the Russian state (64% claiming no to little 
trust), which in fact collapsed after the fall of the USSR.109 
Alarmingly, 42% of those polled after the 1996 presidential 
elections rated the pre-perestroika political regime more positively 
than Russia’s current political regime.110 
The continued weakness of the Russian state and its failure to 
re-build itself was exemplified by the fact that tax collection in Russia 
for 1997 was only 8% of GDP, well below the average of consolidated 
European democracies and only one third of that in developing 
countries.111 Moreover, 56% of Russians polled in 1998 about the ease 
of tax evasion claimed there was “no need to pay” taxes, and a further 
27% claimed that if they were caught, they would only have to pay a 
bribe.112 In addition, the Russian Mafia and the Russian banking 
industry have developed their own coercive and financial structures— 
parallel to those of the state—just as a shadow economy 
developed in the USSR to supplement the ill-functioning command 
economy of socialism.113 These structures permeate the political class, 
as “…Russian public officials have gradually forged a new political 
system where the notions of the rule of law and the public good are 
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secondary to the necessity of keeping power and managing the state’s 
wealth.”114 
After one year in office, the new Russian President 
Vladimir Putin has so far contradicted the principles of democracy 
rather than nourish them.115 The armed assaults on Media-Most’s 
corporate offices and the Glasnost Foundation signal danger for civil 
liberties. The appointment to prime minister of technocrat Mikhail 
Kasyanov, reportedly an ally of oligarch Boris Berezovskii, made many 
democrats flinch. A political solution to the bloodshed in Chechnya is 
more distant now that Putin has decreed Moscow’s direct control over 
the republic for the next few years. The shocking imprisonment of 
Media- Most’s Vladimir Gusinsky sent a startling message to those 
critical of the Kremlin.116 And most recently, Putin’s botched treatment 
of the Kursk nuclear submarine tragedy raised serious questions about 
Russian governmental efficacy and accountability. 
And yet, an interesting point here is that people seemed to 
distrust Putin and the state less than they do parties or parliament. Part 
of the blame for this situation must be placed on the deadlock between 
the executive and legislative branches of government and the political 
conflict that came out of prolonged placement in divided minority 
government. The parliament, “…its lack of cohesion and 
ineffectiveness are also a consequence of the fact that parliament is far 
from being the key decision-making center. Rather, the latter is located 
in the presidential apparatus—which may explain why some of the 
sharpest political conflicts in 1996-97 were among Yeltsin’s closest 
advisers, between Chubais and Alexander Korzhakov, for example, or 
Chernomyrdin and Boris Nemstov, or Lebed and almost everyone 
else.”117 
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What is this semi-presidential constitution and why is it so 
vulnerable? A semi- presidential constitution is one in which the head 
of state is a popularly elected president with a fixed term of office; and 
the head of government is a prime minister who is responsible to the 
legislature. The outstanding feature of semi-presidentialism therefore 
is the existence of two executives. Executive power is shared between 
the president and prime minister, and this sharing by definition 
excludes a neat division, often leading to ambiguity. Moreover, the 
legitimacy, accountability and responsibility of the two executives are 
fundamentally different. The prime minister emanates from the 
legislature and is responsible to it, whereas the president has greater 
autonomy from the legislature and can survive without its approval. 
This autonomy sets up incentives for the president to push his own 
agenda, even if it means invading the prime minister’s domain. The 
shared power, but unequal legitimacy and accountability, structure 
theoretically predictable and empirically verifiable tensions into the 
semi-presidential constitution. 
Imagine, for example, disagreement between the president 
and the prime minister, when it is often not clear which executive has 
final decision authority. The president almost always has 
constitutionally granted emergency powers, and constitutional power 
vis-à-vis the military and the intelligence community. In crises 
situations, it is possible that the president and the legislature issue 
conflicting orders to the military, but the military may decide against 
the decision of the elected majority and in favor of its chief 
commander - the president. The unintended consequence may be 
extended military rule and the suspension of democracy, especially in 
countries with a history of military intervention in politics. 
The greater the president’s scope of powers—particularly decree, 
veto and emergency powers—and the lower the limitations on these 
powers, the greater his possibility to govern without the prime 
minister, or alternatively, with a hand-picked cabinet of allies. 
Presidents who rely extensively on these powers over an extended 
time move the regime out of semi-presidentialism into what I refer to 
as non-democratic hyper- presidentialism. In hyper-presidentialism, 
the extended use of emergency and decree powers violates the 
democratic principles of participation and inclusion. It concentrates 
decision-making in a small, opaque group of individuals under the 
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tutelage of the president, and thus violates institutional guarantees for 
polyarchy, particularly, “institutions for making government policies 
depend on votes and other expressions of preference.” One observable 
characteristic of hyper-presidentialism is the packing of the cabinet 
with non-party, technocratic specialists rather than political party 
representatives. This technocratization of the cabinet divides it even 
further from parties in the legislature. The legislature may try to veto 
a technocratic cabinet and presidential decrees, but the president in 
the semi-presidential type usually retains dissolution power with 
which she can threaten a non-cooperative legislature. 
V. THREE SUBTYPES OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM 
These tensions between the president, the prime minister and the 
legislature are inherent in the structure of semi-presidentialism and are 
therefore permanent. However, the presence of a legislative majority, 
and an amicable relationship between the president and that majority, 
can minimize the probability that these tensions emerge as serious 
institutional conflict. Here I introduce three qualitatively different, 
electorally generated subtypes within semi-presidentialism: 
consolidated majority government (the president and prime minister 
are from the same party/party coalition and have a parliamentary 
majority); divided majority government (the prime minister has a 
legislative majority, but the president is from the opposition); divided 
minority government (neither the president nor the prime minister has 
a parliamentary majority). 
This all means that in order for the constitution to work in a way that 
is supportive of democracy, the party system and electoral system of a 
country with this constitution are absolutely crucial. Here are the 
conditions that worked against this happening in Russia: 
1.  The Absence of an Institutionalized Party System in 
Russia 
At least some minimal degree of party system 
institutionalization is necessary for building presidential and 
legislative majorities. The institutionalization of a party system is 
characterized by the following: (1) regularity in the pattern of party 
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competition (low volatility); (2) stability of party roots in society and 
of citizens strongly and consistently attached to parties; (3) citizens and 
other organized interests perceiving parties to be “the way to go,” and 
accepting them as the legitimate intermediary and means of influence 
in the democratic process; and (4) stability of party organization, 
with party influence at both national and local levels, and party 
elites’ loyalty to their parties. 
Russia’s post-communist party landscape did not meet any 
of these criteria.118 Instead, the Russian party system never allowed 
for coherent and coincident presidential and legislative majorities.119 
These characteristics included a problematic societal cleavage 
structure; the predominance of independents in elections rather than 
party candidates; the divide between center and regional politics; 
the high volatility and low discipline in parties and factions; and the 
 
118 See Bruce L. R. Smith, Constitutionalism in the New Russia, in BRUCE L. R. 
SMITH & GENNADY M. DANILENKO, LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW RUSSIA 
4 (1993). For the counter argument that Russia did indeed begin to develop a party 
system, “albeit a fluid and inchoate one,” see M. Steven Fish, The Advent of 
Multipartyism in Russia, 1993-1995, 11 POST-SOVIET AFFS. 340, 340–383 
(1995). Contra Fish, I would argue (following Sartori, Mainwaring) that one 
cannot speak of a party system unless there is a minimal level of 
institutionalization, which does not yet seem to be the case in Russia. Also see 
Juan J. Linz, Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist 
Europe, in RAY TARAS, POSTCOMMUNIST PRESIDENTS 1–14 (1997) for the 
argument that Russia may be a stalemated, rather than unstructured, party system. 
119 Brazilian parties during, and even after, the early years of democratization 
suffered from a similar underdevelopment, the most decisive features of which 
were most of the parties’ “…fragility, their ephemeral character, their weak roots 
in society, and the autonomy politicians of the catchall parties enjoy with respect 
to their parties.” As a consequence, and perhaps with lessons for Russia, Brazilian 
politics (like other countries with weak party systems) has been plagued by 
serious corruption problems, and powerful economic elites were able to influence 
government by side-stepping the legislature. See Scott Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak 
Parties, Feckless Democracy, in TIMOTHY R. SCULLY, BUILDING DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS 354–398 (1995). 
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anti-party position of the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and his 
successors, including Vladimir Putin.120 
The cleavage structure in Russian society, around which a 
party system might have been built, was the first major obstacle to 
institutionalization. There were no parties which could be considered 
real “pairs of opponents,” as in some of the west European democracies 
which have historically had left-right, or secular-religious, cleavages, 
or both. In Russia, “this situation did not develop, as parties did not 
generally call forth opposition from their logical alternatives.”121 
Therefore, the parties that have come into play and hold seats in the 
State Duma are, and have been, with the exception of the Communist 
Party, what Duverger called internally created parties, because they 
were born in the legislature, fathered by political elites.122 The 
formation of these parties, for the most part, did not involve the 
mobilization of any collective identities in Russian society and 
consequently, these parties lacked a social base and “…are either less 
likely, or simply less able, to establish a strong organizational 
network at the mass level.”123 
In the earlier years of democratization, parties tended to base 
their program on the nature of the regime itself, or at least to posit 
“reform” against resistance to reform (which is also sometimes a 
cleavage between change to a new competitive political system versus 
return to some authoritarian system of the past). Another issue around 
which Russian political parties were developing was nationalism.124 
 
120 On the problems of cleavages in post-communist societies, with reference to 
East Central Europe, see JON ELSTER, ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN 
POSTCOMMUNIST SOCIETIES: REBUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA 131–155 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press eds., 1998). 
121 JON ELSTER, CLAUS OFFE & ULRICH K. PREUSS, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN 
POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES 147 (1998). 
122 PETER MAIR, PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE: APPROACHES AND INTERPRETATIONS 
183–184 (1997). 
123 Id. 
124 Walter Laqueur, Russian Nationalism, 71 Foreign Affairs 103, 103–16 (1992); 
see Astrid S. Tuminez, Russian Nationalism and the National Interest in Russian 
Foreign Policy, in Celeste A. Wallander, The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy 
After the Cold War, 41–68 (1996) (showing a typology of Russian nationalism). 
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An emerging party system based on these elite structured cleavages 
is problematic for democratic consolidation, because political 
contestation around these cleavages is not always about policy, but 
rather, about the rules of the game. Surveys conducted in 1993 and 
1995 showed “…clear evidence of anti- democratic tendencies among 
[party] supporters…In particular, supporters of the Communist Party 
and its presidential candidate Gennadiy Zyuganov, and the Liberal 
Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, [were] distinguished 
not just by their expected anti-market and anti-Western stance, but 
by a far greater willingness, under certain conditions, to abandon 
democracy.”125 In a consolidated democracy, there is a majority 
consensus in political and civil society at least on one crucial point: 
that democracy is the best type of regime for processing differences 
of opinion. In the first five years of Russian democracy, there was 
strong evidence that (at least) the supporters of Zhirinovsky and 
Zyuganov considered “…democracy as expendable, in light of the 
magnitude of the problems facing Russia, rather than as the best way 
to mitigate loss.”126 
Another problem of the party landscape in Russia, which 
worked against institutionalization and thus against majorities, was 
high party system fragmentation.127 In 1993, twelve political parties 
 
125 Stephen Whitefield & Geoffrey Evans, Support for Democracy and Political 
Opposition in Russia, 1993-1995, 12 Post-Soviet Affairs No. 3 218, 220 (1996). 
126 Id. at 239. 
127 See Joel M. Ostrow, Procedural Breakdown and Deadlock in the Russian State 
Duma: The Problems of an Unlinked Dual-channel Institutional Design, 50 
Europe-Asia Studies No. 5 793, 793 (1998) (The Duma has a dual-channel 
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committees, prevents the dual-channel design from being an effective 
‘verification’ device and instead often leads to stalemate. On the utility of well-
designed dual-channel systems). 
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managed to get seats in the Russian Duma.128 In addition to these 
twelve parties, 31% of the seats were held by non-party 
independents.129 A positive indication of party system development 
came after the 1995 legislative elections, when independents in the 
Duma were reduced to 12% of the seats. However, after the 1999 
elections, independents held a whopping 25.3% of the Duma seats.130 
There are other indicators of Russia’s poor party system 
institutionalization. For example, many Russian parties have 
competing national and local organizational structures, which 
exacerbate the problems of holding together an already disintegrating 
federal system.131 Indeed, “[n]one of the parties that came into 
existence in 1990-91 . . . had developed into coherent national 
organizations with regional branches. All underwent splits, sometimes 
more than once.”132 And even more problematic is the fact that for the 
parties, “[t]he links with Moscow and the provinces were very 
tenuous, if they existed at  all.”133 
Moreover, deputies don’t seem to care very much about their 
local constituencies once elected. Surveys and interviews of State 
Duma and Federation Council candidates, conducted by the Ford 
Foundation Moscow in St Petersburg in 1993, showed that only 
about 25% of the candidates polled thought about their 
constituency after they were elected. “The notion of working back in 
the constituency with their electors, or in a party, had no place in their 
thinking. Answers to the question, ‘How will you keep in touch with 
your electors?’ revealed that, although a minority had clear ideas, 
 
128 See Alfred Stepan & Cindy Skach, Constitutional Frameworks and 
Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism, 46 
World Pol. 1, 10 (1993). 
129 Id. 
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131 See Peter C. Ordeshook, Russia’s Party System: Is Russian Federalism Viable? 
in POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS 12, 4 at 195–217 (1996) (noting the institutional and 
non-institutional elements which work against federalism in Russia). 
132 Mary McAuley, Russia’s Politics of Uncertainty, 273, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1997). 
133 Id. 
2021 RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 235 
others had hardly thought about it…few had given any thought to 
creating a social constituency for themselves.”134 
Another problem impeding party system institutionalization 
is high volatility. Between the 1993 and 1995 elections to the State 
Duma, the average electoral volatility in terms of votes for parties was 
47.0, almost eight times higher than the European average.135 Between 
the 1995 elections and February 1996, the parties holding seats in the 
Duma had experienced an average gain or loss of 22 seats because 
parliamentarians elected under one party label changed party 
affiliation.136 There is also high volatility with respect to parties’ 
voting patterns in the Duma. Parties have tended to support the 
government on individual issues and pieces of legislation, rather 
than according to a general program or platform. Both Zhirinovsky’s 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation under Zyuganov often supported government 
policies from 1995-1997, despite their strongly anti-government pre-
election attitude.137 Such support was not necessarily in exchange for 
compromises on policies and negotiated political bargains, but rather, 
often in exchange for monetary bribes. As one government official 
mentioned, “the Communists’ and Zhirinovsky’s votes are on 
sale.”138 This type of corrupt majority building is an effect, as 
well as a further permitting condition, of low party system 
institutionalization. 
The inchoate nature of the party system was exacerbated by 
Yeltsin’s anti-party position and Russia’s electoral system (discussed 
below), which has, at best, only weak incentives for majority-building. 
These conditions work against the development of a solid political 
society. This in turn works against democracy. Comparative lessons 
 
134 Id. at 266. 
135 Id. 
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from some Latin American cases demonstrate the connection: in 
Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, inchoate party systems have contributed to 
the presidential practice of “decretismo” and an overall decrease in 
democratic governability; contrariwise, the institutionalized party 
systems of Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica have been 
crucial in helping to reduce corruption and establish a rule of law 
in these countries.139 Inchoate party systems can also paralyze 
parliamentary government, because they can produce uncertain 
coalitions and governmental instability. Thus, it seems bleak for the 
prospects of Russian democracy that the party landscape is still 
underdeveloped and non-institutionalized. As I explore in the next 
chapter, this is particularly problematic under Russia’s semi-
presidential framework, because semi-presidentialism combines the 
potentially unstable situation of divided minority government with 
the possibility of presidential decretismo. Let me now turn to one of the 
important mechanisms which could theoretically improve party 
system institutionalization in Russia and discuss why it has not yet 
been able to do so. 
2. Prospects for Majority-Building Electoral Formulae in 
Russia 
Under certain conditions, an electoral system can manufacture 
legislative majorities. These majorities, in turn, decrease the chances 
that the tensions inherent in semi-presidentialism emerge as conflict. 
Are there any majority-building capacities in Russia’s electoral 
 
139 Interview with Vladimir Mau, Former Close Aid to Gaydar & Chief of the 
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systems? The State Duma’s electoral system combines two different 
formulae: proportional representation (PR) and plurality (or first-past-
the-post). Half of the 450 Duma seats are contested in first-past-the-
post, single member districts. The other half of the Duma seats are 
contested under PR from closed party lists. There is also a 5% 
threshold.140 We can think of the Russian formula as a combination of 
light majority building with some PR. This combination is sometimes 
called personalized PR, particularly in Germany, because it allows 
voters to choose some individual candidates through the single 
member district contests, rather than just choosing from among 
impersonal, closed party lists.141 
Due to the single member district element in this system, not 
all parties will be awarded seats. Moreover, there is a threshold of 5% 
for the PR contests. Rational parties that are not strong enough to win 
single member district elections, or pass a 5% threshold in the PR 
elections, thus have incentives to broker exchanges. For example, 
where Party A realizes that its candidate has no chance in a District 1, 
Party A can withdraw its candidate in that district and ‘offer’ its 
support and its share of the electorate’s support to Party B’s candidate, 
as long as Party B promises to do the same for Party A in another 
district. These are electoral coalitions; whether or not these then 
transfer to policy coalitions is another matter, but it is a start, and it 
can build the idea of compromise and bargaining into the parties. In 
a multi-party system that is well-institutionalized and relatively non-
polarized, the single-member district race and the threshold encourage 
inter-party bargaining and trading among parties, which usually 
reduces the number of parties (over the long run) in the system. 
However, the problem in Russia with this electoral system has 
simply been that the party system is too inchoate to react to the 
aforementioned incentives. One indicator of the Russian parties’ failure 
to react rationally to these incentives is evidenced by the high 
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percentage of split-ticket voting (whereby a voter votes one party for 
the PR race and another party for the single member district race) in 
State Duma elections. By splitting their tickets, voters are often trying 
to vote ‘usefully’ for a familiar, local notable in the single-member 
district election, and then use their party list vote as a protest against 
the party in power at the federal level. Split ticket voting also often 
indicates the electorate’s weak attachment to parties.142 In order to 
discourage split-ticket voting, parties must campaign strongly not 
only for their party in the PR race, but also for their party candidate in 
the single-member district races. In Russia this does not happen. The 
single-member district elections have been personalized, and 
personalities are often more important than party affiliations.143 The 
evidence from the results of the 1993 State Duma elections shows 
that parties either had not employed these strategies, or that the 
electorate was anti- party, or both: 63% of the single-member district 
seats were won by independents. The electoral rule in 1993 which did 
not list party affiliation on the single-member ballot exacerbated split-
ticket voting, but it also appears that parties did not do much to 
counter the high personalization of the elections.144 
In the 1995 elections to the State Duma, 35% of the single-
member district seats were won by independents.145 The decrease in 
the percentage of independents at first suggested an improvement. 
However, the 1999 Duma elections had 51% of the single member 
district seats captured by independents. Moreover, a closer look at 
other indicators shows that this decrease from 1993 to 1995 was the 
result of independent candidates creating new parties and labels for 
themselves, rather than joining existing parties. Thus, while in 1993 
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there were 12 parties winning seats in the Duma, in 1995 there were 
22 parties winning seats in the State Duma.146 That is to say, the 
number of parties actually represented in the Duma was almost 
doubled within two years. As some observers noted, “[i]n the early 
months of 1995, […] the press was full of reports of the formation of 
new political parties, rather than coalitions. […] Thus, even before a 
single vote was cast, a substantial majority of parties were condemned 
to winning nothing.”147 
Electoral system reform has been suggested as a means of 
building up and institutionalizing Russia’s party system. Perhaps the 
PR elections need to be less proportional in order to encourage 
majorities. Writing in 1993, Steven Fish suggested that “…a PR system 
for legislative elections would generate parties…and perhaps even 
create some organizational basis for overcoming the chaos and 
hyper individualism that now enervate soviets on all levels.”148 
However, since Fish had made this suggestion, fragmentation has 
become a serious problem. A greater number of parties will not 
necessarily translate into better parties, or into a structured party 
system. Party proliferation, which can emanate from PR elections if 
there are many social divisions and parties “in-waiting”, has little to 
do with actual party development. 
Party development involves expansion of national party 
organization to local levels and parliamentarians’ commitment to their 
party through, among other things, legislative discipline. Moreover, 
recent research building upon the findings of Stepan and Skach shows 
that countries using “less proportional systems are more likely to 
survive [as democracies] than those with a highly proportional 
system.”149 Finally, a larger number of political parties in a system 
tends to be associated with a higher degree of polarization (ideological 
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or otherwise).150 The fact that Russia is a large and regionally diverse 
federation adds another dimension to the Russian party system.151 The 
Russian Federation approaches the conceptual opposite of what the 
Italians refer to as “partitocrazia,” or partyarchy.152 In the literature on 
parties and democracy, partyarchy is a system that appears to meet all 
the formal requirements for a democracy, but the political parties 
dominate to such an extent that the quality of democracy is questioned. 
Parties in a partyarchy are highly disciplined and centralized, control 
all nominations for public office, have penetrated all existing 
organizations in civil society, and squeeze out any other organizations 
linking government to society.153 
In addition, the media are controlled or extensively monitored 
by parties. Scholar Michael Coppedge argues that something close to 
this ideal type characterized Venezuelan democracy, which is also a 
federation.154 The Russian Federation, however, seems to be the 
conceptual opposite of the ideal type partyarchy. First, Russian parties 
play almost no mediating role between government and society, since 
societal interests themselves are so fragmented, and since individual 
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business oligarchs tend to control most state resources, including the 
Russian media. Russian parties also play almost no role as mediating 
institutions; more than 80% of Russians polled in 1998 distrusted 
political parties.155 Second, Russian parties have little internal 
discipline, and in elections held in single-member districts, have 
almost no control over nominations. This occurs because most 
parties—excepting the Communists and, in the past, the Agrarians—
have had inadequate grass-roots bases and were therefore “unable to 
nominate credible, electable candidates to win single-member 
districts.”156 If Italian partyarchy is one extreme end of a continuum, 
then the Russian party situation, which we can call patriarchy, is on 
the opposite end.157 Neither partyarchy nor patriarchy is fully 
democratic. 
Another element contributing to the patriarchy in Russia was 
the absolute majority run-off system used to elect the president. As I 
discussed earlier, this presidential electoral system may, under 
conditions of inchoate parties, further polarize the electorate and 
personalize elections instead of bringing parties together. Russia’s 
1996 presidential elections, in which Yeltsin’s main opponent was 
Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov was a clear example.158 
The binary nature of the two-round electoral system structured this 
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two-man race, which to many seemed more like a referendum on 
Communism than an election based on the policy programs of the 
candidates.159 In sum, the electoral formulae used in Russia have never 
been the strongest for encouraging legislative majorities. But even the 
incentives that do exist in the legislative electoral system are not 
effective, because the party system itself remains unstructured, and the 
Russian social fabric has problematic cleavages around which 
coalition-able parties cannot really develop.  Now I will turn to a third 
crucial condition that impedes majority formation, the legacy of 
Russia’s first anti-party president. 
3.  Boris Yeltsin, and The Anti-Party President 
In semi-presidential constitutions, it is crucial that a president 
be actively supported by, and an active supporter of, a political party. 
I showed elsewhere that to a certain extent even Charles de Gaulle, and 
to a much greater extent the successive presidents of the Fifth 
Republic, were all “party men” in this sense, and consequently were 
often able to rally majority support in the electorate and, with help 
from majority building electoral systems, in the legislature. This 
enabled French presidents to operate under the least conflict-prone 
subtype of semi-presidentialism much of the time. I have also, 
elsewhere, looked at this condition in Weimar, and discussed how 
Friedrich Ebert’s “party man” quality likewise helped minimize 
conflict in Weimar’s early years, but how the non-party presidency of 
General Hindenburg contributed to conflictual semi-presidentialism, 
which may have eventually led to breakdown. 
Unlike France, but similar to the latter years of Weimar, the 
first directly elected Russian President Boris Yeltsin never created a 
political party for himself, nor did he join any of the parties which 
began to form in Russia after 1990. Yeltsin had spent half of his life in 
the Communist Party, but shunned the nascent parties of post-
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communist Russia.160 In spite of the advice of two of his close advisors, 
Sergey Shakhray and Gennadiy Burbulis, Yeltsin missed crucial 
opportunities to form a party when his popularity was high—for 
instance, after his election to the presidency of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in June 1991.161 As the Chief of 
Operational Analysis of the Analytical Directorate in the State Duma 
admitted,  “[O]n several important instances, the President skillfully 
avoided all chances to be part of a party.”162 For example, the DR 
“provided crucial support for Yeltsin’s presidential victory in June 
1991, yet his victory did not lead to its consolidation as the ‘party of 
power,’ or indeed, to its consolidation as a party at all. Yeltsin clearly 
felt more at ease working through his own ‘team’ free of political or 
social control.”163 Unsurprisingly, an important faction of the DR had 
formally moved into opposition against Yeltsin by 1993.164 This was to 
be expected, since Yeltsin’s treatment of the DR demonstrated a lack 
of forward-looking strategy and a lack of appreciation for the support 
he received, which “makes no sense as an electoral strategy. To 
communists, he remains a traitor. To liberals, he has abandoned all the 
values that made him popular. Thus, he has eliminated his political 
base.”165 
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In trying to understand why Yeltsin would eliminate his 
political base without much concern for future consequences, it is 
important to realize that Yeltsin viewed politics “not as a coalitional 
process […] but as a zero-sum game of personal struggle for power.”166 
This is a warlike, rather than peace-oriented and legalistic, view of 
politics. In the former, force monitors persuasion, might establishes 
right, and conflict resolution is sought in terms of the defeat of the 
enemy—of the other ‘looked’ on as a hostis. In the latter, force is kept 
in reserve as an ultima ratio, as a last and worst reason, and conflict 
resolution is sought by means of covenants, courts and “rightful” 
procedures. 167 
Indeed, Yeltsin, most poignantly in Moscow in 1993 and in 
Chechnya in 1994, demonstrated his warlike view of politics and his 
propensity to resolve conflict through force and the defeat of the 
enemy, rather than through compromise or by means of “rightful” 
procedures. Yeltsin himself admitted that covenants, courts, and other 
rightful procedures were alien, since “[t]he very word constitution was 
a strange dish for us to taste.”168  Yeltsin was even extremely suspicious 
of his inner circle and, not unlike Stalin, followed a pattern of 
individual and isolated leadership based on perceptions of insecurity 
and fear of the enemy, of the “other.” 169 In Yeltsin’s own words, 
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2021 RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 245 
“people at the top generally have no friends. You develop a kind of 
insularity and exercise incredible caution in dealing with people.  All 
of this is true of me—the insularity, the caution in speaking with new 
acquaintances.170 
Yeltsin’s justification for not attaching himself to any political 
party was based on his belief that the president alone was the arbiter 
of the system. According to Yeltsin, the president—by remaining 
above parties—could safeguard against the “swing” in policies that 
would inevitably result from party alternation in government.171 This 
belief is evident from Yeltsin’s memoirs, where he writes that: 
I would like to believe . . . that the majority of Russians 
realize [that] the only definite guarantor of calm is the 
president himself. That is, if they elected him, they 
should stick to their choice. If the country is gradually, 
though very slowly, coming out of the crisis, if the day 
of judgment promised by both the left and the right is 
not coming, then that means it is possible to live—and 
live with that president.172 
However, the fact that Yeltsin took the reins over so many 
crucial decisions seems incongruent with the role of a genuine 
arbiter.173 Moreover, a genuine arbiter is not antipolitical, as Yeltsin 
seemed to be. Finally, even if we give Yeltsin the benefit of the doubt 
and consider him to have had the role of arbiter, or of a heroic leader 
like de Gaulle, “once the emergency is over, the heroic leader seems 
out of place” and turns into “a flagrant reminder of the incapacity of 
the political class to cope with serious problems successfully.”174 
Indeed, Yeltsin’s domination of political decision-making de-
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legitimized the Russian political system by suggesting the incapacity 
of the other institutions. 
Had Yeltsin encouraged the development of parties to back 
him in the legislature, Yeltsin might have avoided the precarious 
periods of divided minority government that plagued his terms in 
office. Instead, Yeltsin preferred to “stay unconstrained, and thus 
capable of maneuver.”175 As a former, close aide to Yeltsin said, “[t]he 
President has some sort of allergy to parties, and he wants to control 
all decisions; he’s not a team player.”176 
What have been the consequences of Yeltsin’s anti-partyness 
for the development of democracy? First, Yeltsin tipped the balance of 
institutional power in favor of the president, away from the 
government and the legislature. He built a vertical, strongly 
presidential power system in which parties do not play a central role. 
Yeltsin restructured several institutions, such as the Security Council 
and the Foreign Ministry, so that most decisions would come under 
his direct command.177 Yeltsin’s presidential administration expanded 
to over 3500 staff members by 1994, and there were numerous 
committees and offices that took research and administrative tasks 
away from the legislature and placed them under presidential 
administration.178 Second, as a further means of extending his control 
throughout the vast federation, Yeltsin appointed loyal cronies to the 
posts of predstaviteli prezidenta (presidential representatives) or glavy 
administratsii (heads of administration) in the regions, and relied on 
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these representatives individually for support in the regions, and 
collectively for support in the Federation Council.179 After 1995, Yeltsin 
no longer had the legal power to appoint regional leaders (now 
elected) or members of the Federation Council, who are now popularly 
elected. However, Yeltsin continued to influence control over the 
dismissal and replacement of governors in regions which had not yet 
held elections. In the first half of 1996, for example, Yeltsin managed 
to replace six governors.180 
The clearest example of Yeltsin’s concentration of power at the 
expense of other political institutions was his decision to use force in 
October 1993 against the Congress of People’s Deputies, which had 
decided to impeach him. A major faction in the Supreme Soviet at the 
time was becoming increasingly reactionary, but Yeltsin’s 
uncompromising attitude and “might over right” style of conflict 
resolution pre-empted the road for compromise. Sergey Kovalev, 
former Human Rights Commissioner under Yeltsin, suggested that 
Yeltsin even encouraged the October 1993 conflict, since “all of 
[Yeltsin’s actions in] 1993 were done to provoke Rutskoy and 
Khasbulatov to take the first move toward force. Yeltsin was waiting 
for this.”181 When Yeltsin recounts this period in his memoirs, we 
immediately realize that Yeltsin did not understand the constitutional 
interdependence between the president and the Congress of People’s 
Deputies. Yeltsin writes: 
Why is the word impeachment so terrible? After all if 
the Congress passed such a motion it would have no 
legal force. A popularly elected president could not be 
removed from power by the Congress, especially this 
Congress, which had long ago lost the people’s trust. 
Furthermore, the subjective factor is not important 
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here; what’s important is the legal substance of the 
issue - the Congress does not have the power to 
remove the president because it did not elect him. Any 
schoolchild could understand that.182 
Yeltsin’s isolated leadership and anti-legislature attitude set a 
poor precedent for other political candidates.  Simply “because Yeltsin 
remained independent, others followed his example, believing that 
democratic government could function without parties. This 
neutrality by some of Russia’s most well-known figures (Yeltsin, 
Popov, Stankevich, Sobchak) seriously retarded the development of 
party affiliation.”183 One might have thought that Yeltsin would have 
experienced a certain degree of political learning, realizing how 
important parties are for real democratic power under semi-
presidentialism. However, with the advent of the 1996 presidential 
election campaign, Yeltsin made no effort to enlist party support. His 
only campaign technique consisted of what some analysts have 
described as “buying” society—through more than 64 decrees issued 
from January to June of 1996, which gave social benefits to certain 
underprivileged (and large) constituencies.184 Yeltsin’s regional 
headquarters, in these months prior to the election, became “‘a 
glorified social services and janitor’s office combined’ that was 
working hard to make the president ‘look kind and fair like Robin 
Hood come alive.’”185 
In comparative terms, many of the Latin American 
democracies have seen similar populist campaign practices, especially 
in the federated Latin American states where regional elites also act as 
local representatives of the president.186 But even in these examples, 
presidents have made pre-election “deals” with local elites and 
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pursued populist strategies through the existing parties.187 Even in 
post-communist Georgia, President Eduard Shevardnadze launched 
the Citizens’ Union in November 1993 in an effort to ensure political 
support in the Georgian legislature. The presidential elections of 1995 
gave Shevardnaze’s party the majority he needed to govern 
democratically, and consequently, “[t]hroughout 1996, the new 
parliament functioned cohesively and productively to enact key 
legislation underpinning the foundations of  civil society and of 
economic reform.”188 In Russia, however, there is a continuous circle 
which works against parties: the more that Yeltsin ignored parties and 
alienated them from his decisions, the more directly dependent he was 
on civil society, which was itself weak, unstable, and lacked 
crystallized identities.189 Thus Yeltsin’s support group never 
consolidated and remained, as it was during his first presidential term, 
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“a conglomeration of individuals whose only unifying thread was 
personal rapport with the president.”190 
If we compare Yeltsin to the first directly elected president of 
the French Fifth Republic, General de Gaulle, it becomes even clearer 
that Yeltsin’s attitude towards parties did not even approach what is 
necessary for minimizing conflict in semi-presidentialism. General de 
Gaulle, not unlike Yeltsin, was the first president of a new republic, 
had a high percentage of initial popular support, and was trusted with 
the responsibility of re-equilibrating a system that was on the brink of 
civil war. De Gaulle gradually realized how parties could help him 
manage the potentially conflictual semi-presidential institutions by 
giving him a majority in the legislature, and therefore, full, democratic 
access to presidential powers. 191 Within the first years of the Fifth 
Republic, there is evidence of de Gaulle reaching out to the Union pour 
la nouvelle République (UNR), the party that took its inspiration from de 
Gaulle and considered de Gaulle its leader.192 Over de Gaulle’s 
presidency, he increasingly filled government cabinets with members 
of the UNR, demonstrating support of the party. 
The difference the party-man condition made in terms of de 
Gaulle’s support in the first two legislatures of the Fifth Republic is 
important.  When we compare it to Yeltsin’s official party support in 
the first two legislatures, to de Gaulle’s, the difference is striking. Of 
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course, in the inchoate party landscape of Russia, there were several 
parties that supported the president and the government although 
they had no official affiliation with Yeltsin or support from him. 
However, this meant that there was no certainty of support over time, 
but rather, that support was bargained for in the State Duma on each 
individual issue, most certainly adding to the already high degree of 
uncertainty and volatility in the system. 
Yeltsin’s successor to the Russian presidency, Vladimir 
Vladimirovich Putin, took office de facto on January 1, 2000, after 
Yeltsin’s resignation. Putin was the popularly elected in the first round 
of voting in March, 2000. Putin, like Yeltsin, has declared himself to be 
“above” party politics. In an open campaign letter to the Russian 
people published on his personal web page, Putin claimed that “[t]he 
poverty of peoples cannot be justified by any references to the purity 
of party principles, whether ‘Right’ or ‘Left’ ones.” The party that has 
thus far supported Putin most steadfastly—Yedinstvo (Unity)—still has 
no real political program and lacks organizational strength. It is, in that 
sense, weaker than the Communist Party, and less well-grounded at 
the regional and local levels. Moreover, before his election, Putin 
suggested that democracy was “dictatorship of the law,” evoking 
images—albeit distant ones—of the Latin American dictators of the 
1970s, for whom some sense of legality, but not democratic legitimacy, 
was integral to the regime. Human rights advocates, including the 
current Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Oleg Mironov, 
express concern over Putin’s plans for a “strong state.” Recently Putin, 
adding to this concern, told Russians in a public address that they have 
been too optimistic about achieving democracy quickly. What’s more, 
Putin’s centralization-of-power, “strong state” plan, as well as some of 
his recent ministerial appointments, will facilitate informal 
mechanisms of influence and representation which will continue to 
side-step and delegitimize political parties and courts. Thus, Putin 
was, problematically, just as much of a non-party man as Yeltsin had 
been during the entire first decade of Russian democracy. 
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Table 2: Three Crucial Conditions for Minimizing Conflict in 
Semi-Presidentialism. 
 
Postcommunist Russia 1991-1999 
 
One:   Two:   Three:   
Institutionalization of the Majority- Building Integration of 
Presidents 
Party System Capacity of the Electoral into the Party System 
Very Low    Low   Non-Existent 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
As supported by the data discussed above, Russia had conditions 
that keep it in divided minority government, the most problematic 
subtype of the semi-presidential constitution, for the first decade of its 
transition from non-democratic rule. Russia’s chances for moving 
toward democracy under semi-presidentialism were and still are 
today clearly less than the chances of moving further toward a non-
democratic alternative, or remaining in a state of arrested transition, 
unless there are major changes that would involve developing an 
institutionalized party system (endogenously), changing electoral 
rules to promote political parties and party coalitions, amending the 
constitution to give less unilateral power to the president, and 
ensuring that future presidents identify with a political party and are 
willing to set a tradition of not using their constitutional powers 
beyond their limits as a substitute for a Duma majority. A tall order for 
a country spanning many time zones—a country so rich in culture and 
potential, awaiting its true democratic birth. 
